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Careers and organizational goals: managing competing
interests in cross-sector research and development centres

Abstract
Research of potential socio-economic value is often conducted within cross-sector (government, university,
business) centres. There has been growing interest among science policy researchers in seeking to understand
the organizational dilemmas confronted in cross-sector research collaboration. While there is clearly a coalition
of interests among partners engaged with collaborative research their broader organizational objectives and
strategies may converge, diverge, or even compete. Yet little empirical evidence exists on (a) how individual
researchers perceive the benefits of their participation, (b) how far the structures and functions of particular
collaborative R&D centres coalesce around of researchers’ expectations and, (c) what problems arise for
researchers who opt for a ‘second job’ in the centre. Within the broad policy and organizational context of the
Australian Cooperative Research Centres this chapter presents a qualitative analysis of a survey of respondents
from public sector organizations and universities involved in the centres. We use the perspective of the
individual research scientists to illuminate the management issues of trust, governance, and competition
between functional domains, which emerge from the field of inter-organizational relationships (IOR) and
which have been inadequately recognized in the context of collaborative R&D centres. The findings have
implications for the management of the centres, for the careers of research scientists and for public policy.
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Introduction: emerging fissures in the research system

The unprecedented growth in cross-sector (industry–academic–government) collaboration in
research and development (R&D) reflects far-reaching changes in the relationship between
sciences, notably in the organizations that carry out research. R&D is increasingly being
carried out in organizational forms, such as university–industry collaborative research
centres, which are built around cross-sectoral and trans-disciplinary teams with well-defined
socio-economic objectives in mind.
Two influential models seek to explain the institutional configuration of cross-sector
R&D observed: the ‘triple helix’ model of university–industry–government relations
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1997) and the ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production of ‘science in
the context of application’ which (Gibbons et al. 1994) contrast with ‘Mode 1’ traditional
science pursued within discipline-based structures like university departments. Critics of
these models argue that they reflect nothing new: that academic research has always been
heterogeneous in character and comprised elements of trans-disciplinary and strategic
research (Rip 2000; Ziman 1991). In our view, this overlooks the significance of the new
forms of collaborative organization, their scale and complexity, their novelty (e.g. as
distributed or virtual centres) and their effect on existing institutions like university
departments and disciplines (Turpin and Garrett-Jones 2000). We consider the models
limited because they fail to explain how the new cross-sector R&D organizations are best
structured, managed and sustained and how the process of renegotiation takes place between
the centres and the member institutions.
Academic staff involved in collaborative research centres in the US generally hold
continuing appointments in a university department (Boardman and Bozeman 2007) or, in
Australia, may be researchers with government institutions. Effectively they hold multiple
jobs or roles. Through their affiliation with the centre, these staff not only accept additional
responsibility, but responsibilities which may sit incongruently with those in their home
institution. This arrangement parallels Merton’s observation about the competition for
resources and potential incompatibility between the multiple roles involved in a position as a
university professor or scientist in a research organization (Merton and Barber 1976).
Examples of situations that might lead to work incompatibility (Boardman and Bozeman
2007) are the different reward and incentive systems in the centres by comparison with
academic departments, or divergences in research interests between the problem-oriented
centre and the discipline-based academic department. (Shove 2000:64) speaks of ‘a
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multiplicity of research regimes’ and ‘a range of settings each of which interprets, values
and rewards research differently’.
Life in the ‘triple helix’ has been portrayed in terms of choices made by individual
researchers in the extent they wish to commit to ‘involvement in multiple worlds’ (Henkel
2004). The social scientists surveyed by Shove (2000) were ‘struggling with the stresses
and strains of simultaneously inhabiting different worlds’. Gulbrandsen (2000) sees it not as
a question of resolving tensions (e.g. between scientific excellence and utility), but
balancing them – constructing various individual strategies of ‘portfolio management’, as
Shove (2000) puts it. Gibbons et al. (1994:48) argue that universities and government
laboratories have entered ‘the game of dynamic competition’, where ‘knowledge resources
are held in different organizations and can be shifted between environments which are at one
moment competitive and at another collaborative’. These environments are not discrete, but
are populated by actors who ‘move back and forth’, for example, researchers who work
concurrently in a university department and a centre. While acknowledging the movement of
researchers, Gibbons et al. (1994:41) on the other hand talk about the ‘strain of
multifunctionality’ as an institutional challenge affecting, for example, universities and
professional societies rather than individuals.
Recent work by Boardman and Bozeman (2007:431) interprets the ‘multiple and
perhaps conflicting demands of multiple allegiance’ within the ‘unusually complex
institutional environment of [centres]’ (Boardman and Bozeman 2007:440). It thus covers
similar ground to the current paper. Boardman and Bozeman’s contribution is to use role
theory to examine these tensions and to extend the idea of individual ‘role strain’ or ‘role
conflict’ within a single organization (Box and Cotgrove 1966)1 to encompass the ‘centreinduced role strain’ that may be produced by working across organizations. As in the current
paper’s discussion of ‘functional domains’ Boardman and Bozeman (2007:439) examine
problems at different organizational levels (e.g. within-department or within-centre role
strain versus centre-department role strain). Rightly Boardman and Bozeman play down Box
and Cotgrove’s (1966) notion of ‘strain minimization’ as the prime individual response,
pointing out that, as in the Australian study discussed in this chapter, participants voluntarily
take on the challenge of working within the setting of a cross-sector research centre. In
conclusion Boardman and Bozeman quote NSF’s Erik Bloch in saying ‘it’s up to the

1

Role strain results from ‘a lack of congruence between the needs and interests of the individual and the
demands of the organization’ (Box and Cotgrove 1966:24).
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individual’ whether or not he/she is prepared to work within a cross-sector R&D centre and
propose a focus on the ‘personnel management and policy issues’ provoked by such centres.
We acknowledge the importance of centres for individual researcher’s career choices
(Turpin et al. 2005) and the salience of the voluntary/cooperative aspect of participation in
centres. But, in our view, managing the competing demands within cross-sector centres
cannot be relegated to a problem solely for the individual, or ‘a side effect requiring
clarification and remedy’ (Boardman and Bozeman 2007:437). Rather it reflects a central
and deliberate feature of the complex and hybrid institutional environment of collaborative
research centres and must be specifically addressed when designing management structures
and regimes for the centres.
One explicit goal of policies which institutionalize cross-sector multidisciplinary
research, including Australia’s Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) program, is to
challenge the conservative norms and cultures of academic disciplines, universities, research
organizations and firms by exposing them to each others’ cognitively different worlds. It is
long recognized that productive research teams require a balance between challenge and
security, a range of ‘creative tensions’ whose dimensions include the relationships between
science and its application, and between individual independence and organizational
coordination (Pelz and Andrews 1976). As Nooteboom (2000) points out, one reason why
inter-organizational networks encourage innovation is that they bring together people with a
greater ‘cognitive distance’ (CD) between them – an idea akin to the ‘creative tensions’ of
Pelz and Andrews (1976). Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (2001:n.p.) ‘expect[s] differences of
perspective, leading to creative interactions in which the participants can transcend the idées
reçues of their respective organizations’. Thus the goal is to promote creativity without
undermining the traditional strengths that the participants bring to the collaboration, such as
commercial focus, mission-orientation or intellectual rigour.
Recent empirical work by Cummings and Kiesler (2007, 2005) examines
coordination and the trade-off between innovation opportunities and coordination costs
within multi-university research collaboration. The authors find a direct correlation between
coordination activities, which include ‘relationship development’ (Cummings and Kiesler
2005:704) and project outcomes, but conclude that coordination costs are a significant
barrier to collaboration. Their arguments draw upon several institutional-based views of the
problem: organization theory and forms of coordination, the knowledge-based view of
collaboration between firms, and theoretical and empirical studies of distributed work
practices (Cummings and Kiesler 2007) and social network research (Cummings and Kiesler
5

2005). They conclude that the trade-off between the benefits of collaboration and the
transaction costs is a general issue within distributed innovation systems.
Use of the role theory lens implies that independent variables related to individual
scientists’ values and expectations will be relevant. Indeed Box and Cotgrove (1966)
originally proposed a trichotomy of types of scientist which they linked to particular
occupational choices. Neither we (Garrett-Jones et al, 2005a, 2005b) nor Boardman and
Bozeman (2007) compare the views of researchers working within centres with a similar
group of researchers who avoid centre-based research. What does emerge, however, is a
rather surprising commonality of views among the centre-based researchers. We have found
few significant differences in the responses of academic and government researchers to the
quantitative questions in our survey (Garrett-Jones et al. 2005b). Likewise, Boardman and
Bozeman fail to find any relationship between role strain and individual variables like
gender, tenure status or academic discipline. They do however see organizational relations
factors (such as the formality of relations, or the closeness of ties) as correlated with role
strain. In our survey, again it was broader organizational factors (such as policies on access
to national research council grants) that led to divergence of opinion between academic and
government researchers, rather than factors related to individual motivations for centre
membership.
What emerges from the empirical literature on R&D centres is (1) an agreement that
inhabiting multiple roles, domains or worlds creates new or aggravated sources of tensions
and problems; (2) an understanding that participation involves a trade-off between the
benefits and costs of membership, the latter including costs of relationship-building and
coordination; and (3) that organizational structures, such as degree of bureaucratic or
participatory management (Chompalov et al. 2002) and activities, such as extent of
communication (Cummings and Kiesler 2007) are demonstrably pertinent to the success of
collaborations. However, the literature reveals ambivalence about the relative contribution of
individual and organizational factors in responding to these challenges. Participation in
cross-sector centres is voluntary and may be explained in terms of personal attitudes and
individual choice. But the values held by researchers do not necessarily help in
distinguishing between those who thrive in cross-sector research environments and those
who do not. Forms of organization, which vary with factors such research field, scale of the
collaboration and geographic dispersion, also influence collaborative outcomes. This leads
Elzinga (2004:8) to be less than sanguine about ‘Mode 2’ and ‘triple helix’ collaborations,
observing that ‘democratic corporatism’ and ‘convergence and

agreement [are
6

emphasized]…while potential conflict and exclusion mechanisms are toned down, giving
rise to a picture of smooth and peaceful collaboration across institutional borders’. Are these
tensions unique to cooperative research centres, or do they arise in other forms of interorganizational collaboration?

2.

Cooperative research centres as inter-organizational relationships

In some countries, CRCs are one of the most important mechanisms to foster collaboration.
They usually take place in countries with strong federal programs, such us the United States,
Germany and Australia, resulting in a wide and stable national network of centres, through
which other funding mechanisms are allocated. A recent analysis of Australian CRCs drew
attention to the ways in which different CRCs have evolved in the Australian system (Turpin
et al, 2011). According to that analysis, after two decades since its introduction the
Australian CRC program has reached a ‘policy crossroad’ and it is unrealistic to expect a
single discrete program to manage the diversity of missions encompassed by the collective
aims and objectives of organisations and personnel that comprise the contemporary cohort
of centres.
A recent study of cooperative research in Norway has found that project based
research funding and centre based funding were leading to unexpected differences in the
extent to which collaboration was becoming institutionalised (Thune and Gulbrandsen,
2011). Their analysis showed that although centrally funded research centres were more
formalised in structure and process, they were more weakly institutionalised than research
collaborations supported through project based funding programs. Thune and Gulbrandsen’s
explanation for this difference was due to the many different modalities of collaboration and
the variety of expectations of industry partners. This was a similar observation to the
Australian analysis noted above with both suggesting a need for greater diversity in the
design of funding systems directed toward the promotion of cross sector collaboration.
Recent studies into cooperative research centres in the United States provide an
interesting contrast where progressive legislative changes since the 1980s have contributed
to a huge growth in university based research centres. Gray (2011) has noted that according
to the 2010 Research Centres and Services Directory there are almost 16,000 universitybased non-profit research centres in the U.S. and Canada, a large proportion of which would
be similar to the Australian CRCs. Yet, besides this more formal collaborative mode a great
deal of cross-sector research collaboration takes place between individuals and institutions
informally and without external policy intervention. Gray’s analysis presents the U.S.
7

experience with cross-sector research collaboration as a diversified system of public policy
that includes elements of a science policy, technology policy and innovation policy
producing

an

innovative

ecosystem

from

basic

research

to

very downstream

commercialisation efforts’ (Gray, 2011: 131). In this complex policy environment Gray
points to the pressing need for effective policy coordination and, because of program
overlap, the redundancy of many programs and initiatives.
The emergence and consolidation of cross-sector collaborative R&D centres suggest
the possibility of two separate career paths for scientists: one that progresses through an
institutional structure such as a university or public research institute and one that is
embedded in an industrial structure steered much by commercial opportunities, offering
contract rather than tenured terms of employment. These pathways are not mutually
exclusive and there is evidence that some scientists move regularly across the boundaries
(Turpin et al, 1996). However, there is also evidence that diversity in the nature of
cooperative research centres has contributed to different modes of institutional collaboration.
Schiller (2011) has drawn attention to the diversity of actors operating in a more bottom-up
fashion that has lead to the diversity of centres with different roles and impact on their
national or regional innovation systems. He has argued that the differing expectations of
scientists and their managing institutions has contributed to a ‘reconfiguration’ of the
German science system that has influenced both formal organization within the system as
well as informal practice. In order to better understand this process he offers an analytical
framework for exploring the separate and different impacts of CSRC programs on (a)
researchers, (b) the science sector and (c) the innovation system, according to the scope of
the program, potential reward, and governance procedures. In his final analysis he argues
that while some program configurations may lead to more formalised modes of governance
others will continue as informal arrangements because they do not align easily with
expectations or indeed the organisational structures concerning potential reward. The
possibility of parallel career paths is certainly one way of ameliorating ambiguity between
scientists’ differing career opportunities and expectations.
The growth of cross sector collaborative research centres parallels the emergence of
inter-organizational relationships (IOR) in business, notably the alliances of firms aimed at
introducing technologically based new products and services in markets. Such centres and
alliances can be regarded as a class of inter-organizational relationship, that has been
variously termed ‘hybrid organization’ (Menard 2004; Lamb and Davidson 2004; Minkoff
2002), ‘virtual organization’ (Handy 1995; Hatch 1997; Holland and Lockett 1998;
8

Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999) or form of ‘cooperative network’ (Castells 2001; Handy 1993).
As Chompalov et al. (2002) observe, network forms of organization have been widely
studied for firms, non-profit and government organizations, but less so for interorganizational R&D arrangements.
The typology and dynamics of these hybrid organizations still remain poorly
understood. Menard (2004:345-347) notes that hybrid organizations may be thought of as a
‘heterogeneous set of arrangements’ that ‘rely neither on markets nor hierarchies for
organizing transactions’. He argues that hybrid organizations ‘form a specific class of
governance structures’ (Menard 2004:368), which share common characteristics and
problems. These include the difficulties of coordinating contractual arrangements that
involve autonomous partners, particularly where a high degree of uncertainty about the
value of the products of the collaboration is involved; and the fact that they are neither
driven solely by market considerations, nor subject to the command and control of a single
organization (Menard 2004).
The first issue in managing voluntary or loosely contractual relationships is therefore
managing autonomous partners. If the collaboration is to arise and be sustained, all
participants must see some benefit that they could not achieve more easily alone or in some
other way, otherwise there is a ‘credible threat’ of unilateral action, for example, that they
will unilaterally withdraw (Oster 1994:247). This raises the question of how partners
(individually or institutionally) initially assess and continue to monitor the benefits and costs
of their participation in cooperative R&D.
The notion of risk and trust in IORs is well expounded in the literature. Holland and
Lockett (1998:606) describe the coalescence of virtual organizations around outcomes, and
the need to deal with the risk that the outcome may not be achieved: ‘there is a significant
level of risk associated with the outcome…and organizational trust has been hypothesized to
be an explanatory variable for the development of such cooperative behaviour’. Nooteboom
(2000:918) recognizes of two elements of what he calls ‘the slippery notion of trust’. These
elements are competence (or the capability to deliver the agreed outcomes) and intention
(the degree to which parties are committed to the avowed goals and avoid opportunism—
that is, putting self-interest above the goals of the group or organization).
Hybrid organizations not only combine different organizational behaviours, but
operate across broad and complex organizational environments. In this sense they are truly
‘boundary spanning’ (Steenhuis and Gray 2006). Minkoff (2002:381) makes the crucial
observation that ‘hybrid organizations operate in multiple functional domains’, compared
9

with organizations that operate within ‘clearly defined technical and institutional
boundaries’. Other authors term these functional domains ‘sub-cultures’ or ‘societal subsystems’. Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons (2001) talk about hybridization also in the sense of
combination of scientific disciplines and multidisciplinarity. This allows the idea that
different functional domains can exist within and across the partner organizations as well as
between them. As Ziman (1991: 45-47) has shown, universities are quite unlike firms in this
regard because of their highly segmented components—departments, research centres and so
on; and the ‘blurred line’ between academics acting as university staff and performing as
independent entrepreneurs. We suggest that Minkoff’s term ‘functional domains’ can be
applied to encompass and extend these ‘different worlds’ and ‘research regimes’ posited by
Shove (2000) and Henkel (2004). The idea of competition between functional domains thus
provides an institutional counterpart to ‘role strain’ at the individual level.
A wide cognitive distance between the participants has the merit of bringing in new
ideas, but also creates problems of mutual incomprehensibility. The partners will have
different views—not just about the science of the project, but, as Gibbons et al. (1994) point
out, also what constitutes ‘fair play’. This raises the question of what is the appropriate
balance between trust and ‘formal government’ (Menard 2004) required to coordinate crosssector R&D organizations, and what ‘governance’ and rules are accepted and enforced. It
also brings up issues such as what is regarded as legitimate competition, collaboration,
ownership and reward (Gibbons et al. 1994), and how the objectives and strategies of the
centre are determined and implemented (Steenhuis and Gray 2006).
What the IOR literature brings to the discussion is (1) an emphasis on the autonomy
of partners, and therefore on the benefit-cost equation from each partner’s perspective; (2)
the extension of the idea of competing roles (at the individual level) into that of competing
functional domains (at the level of the group or organization); (3) questions related to trust
and reputation (and its breach), how partners are chosen, how trust is assessed and built, and
how the risk of opportunist behaviour between partners can be reduced; and (4) questions
concerning alternative forms of governance for collaborative research and particularly the
choice between consensual or centralized, directive management.
These are all essentially management issues that potentially impact on scientists’
careers and the strategic directions of cooperative research centers and the organizational
partners within their structure. Inherent contradictions in the process according to Howells
and Edler (2011) are a driving force for new forms of institutional governance and
configurations of relationships, a process that they call ‘structural innovation. Studies of
10

cross-sector research centres in Australia (Turpin et al, 2011) Germany (Schiller, 2011) and
Norway (Thune and Gulbrandsen, 2011) are providing growing evidence that these hybrid
organizations are driving ‘structural innovation’ in their national innovation systems. For
example, in Australia there is evidence that the CRC model is evolving as part of a ‘wholeof-government approach’ to the implementation of major national policy, such as ‘Clean
Energy Futures’. As the CRC Association has argued: ‘the CRC model is well suited to
delivering the innovations that will be necessary to address these challenges’ (Peacock,
2011). The introduction of broader policy objectives into the management strategies of
CRCs may serve to provide a stronger scientific base for the broader policy objectives.
However, it is likely to contribute further to contradictions between career and multiorganizational objectives. The remainder of this chapter focuses on these competing
demands in the Australian CRC experience.

3.

Managing identities, divided loyalties and competing interests in
Australian CRCs.

3.1.

Propositions

This chapter explores the contention that lessons learnt from the management of IORs
generally are of help in understanding the interactions between the partners in cross-sector
R&D collaboration, including the experience of individual researchers, the effect on existing
institutions like academic departments and disciplines and the structure and governance of
the collaborative centre itself.
Using qualitative data from a survey of Australian CRC participants we analyze
participants’ views on the attractions and problems of working within these new
organizations. We structure the findings and discussion according to three sets of research
questions:
(1) What drivers and benefits of centre participation are reported by participants? What
motivates researchers to found, join and remain in cross-sector R&D centres?
(2) How are centre identities negotiated and agreed? What values do participants bring to
the negotiation; how important is trust between participants and how is it defined? How
do participants view the governance structures of the centres; how are boundaries and
rules determined and enforced?; and
(3) How are divided loyalties and competing demands perceived and resolved? What
causes researchers to become dissatisfied or disillusioned with these centres, and how
do they respond?
11

These themes emerged primarily from our initial analyses of the participants’ responses.
We chose to explore them further because of their resonance with issues raised both in the
research policy and IOR literature and their bearing on the management of cross-sector
R&D centres.
The following section introduces the cross-sector R&D model embodied in the
Australian Cooperative Research Centres and describes the dynamic policy and
organizational context within which they operate. This is followed with a description of the
methods used in the survey of CRC participants and in analyzing the responses. In the
remainder of the chapter we analyze the opinions of respondents in relation to each of the
three sets of questions. Finally we consider implications for the management of the CRCs,
researchers’ careers, and policy initiatives supporting cross-sector, inter-organizational R&D
centres.

3.2 The Australian Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) Program
The Cooperative Research Centres are geographically and institutionally distributed
organizations that rely on the voluntary cooperation of independent partners within a
contractual framework. There are currently 42 CRCs in operation, covering a wide range of
industrially-oriented research (such as polymers or advanced automotive technology) and
national interest research (such as Aboriginal health or greenhouse accounting), each funded
for an initial seven-year term. They involve collaboration between universities, federal and
state (provincial) government research agencies, individual firms and various industry-led
public sector intermediaries. They sometimes engage a chief executive and administrative
and R&D staff in a central office, but most CRC researchers are employed by their
university, business or government laboratory where they continue to work, rather than by
the CRC itself. CRCs are highly complex inter-organizational networks. For example, the
CRC for Polymers combines 11 participant companies in the plastics industry (two of which
are spin-offs from the CRC), two large federal government research agencies, 10
universities, a state government department and another independent cross-sector R&D
centre.

3.3.1 The dynamics of the CRC Program
As the Program has matured an increasingly pertinent issue has been the extent to
which cross-sector activities satisfy evolving program objectives and whether the specific
12

organizations that have emerged are sufficiently flexible and adaptable to deal with
emerging challenges in end-user focussed activities. Table 1 summarises CRC Program
objectives from inception to the most recent funding round (March 2010).
The objectives of the CRC Program have changed substantially over time, notably
becoming far more condensed as Program thinking moved from implementation toward
outcomes. The O’Kane Review (2008: 22) assessed the most significant change in emphasis
as occurring around 2004-06, finding it ‘quite marked: on growth, research users, and
research adoption/commercialization… the focus was on harder-edged outcomes for endusers’. The Productivity Commission (PC), in its earlier (2007) review of public support for
science, also noted the move away from foci on research excellence and postgraduate
training, and broad-based definitions of national and social benefit. The Productivity
Commission (2007) argued that the emphasis on commercialization over early-stage R&D
was risky from a public investment perspective. It created a strong likelihood that CRC
collaborations were substituting for R&D that firms or industries would have conducted
anyway, in the absence of CRCs, and that selection committees would favour
‘collaborations that pursue less risky project outcomes involving lower levels of spillover
benefits’ (Productivity Commission, 2007: 447-8).
(Table 1 about here)
The response of the Australian Government to these independent reviews, and the
substantial weight of support for these views contained in stakeholder input to them, was to
move the Program objectives back toward their earlier focus. This included a reinstated
emphasis on public good outcomes (social and environmental benefit), end-user focused
education and training programs, and SME strategies designed to augment firm R&D
capacity and innovation capability. The most recent Program Guidelines also de-emphasise
commercialization and shift toward a broader basket of activities to ‘deploy research outputs
and encourage take up by end-users’ (DIISR 2010a: 1). The definition of end-user includes
all public organizations, communities or private industries capable of deploying research
outputs from CRCs. For example, an end-user of a health focused CRC’s research output
may be a public health authority, just as it may be a private pharmaceutical firm or a not-forprofit organization.
It is interesting to consider how changes in program objectives reflect policymaker
expectations in terms of the actors engaged with centre activities. The earlier incarnations of
the CRC Program envisaged hybrid actors formed through bottom-up initiatives amongst
13

coalitions of researchers and organizations. As economic actors these early CRCs could be
considered science-push joint ventures, with expectations of their activities more about
system coordination, capacity building and emergent collaborations than about direct market
impact. In more recent times expectations became framed more strongly by demand-pull
initiatives, particularly once activities were explicitly expected to produce a direct financial
return on public investment. CRCs became faced with challenges presented by a range of
economic activities that can broadly be referred to as ‘marketization’ activities (Çalişkan and
Callon, 2010). These include activities such as venture capital sourcing, market feasibility
studies, promoting prototypes, licensing products etc, which are required to bring a product
to the attention of financiers, buyers and other types of commercial actors operating in and
around markets. CRCs, instead of being intermediate organizations producing outputs for
commercialization by specialist marketization actors, were expected to become directly
involved in carrying out these activities themselves. The policy re-orientation was partly due
to a continuing perception of weak science output commercialization capabilities amongst
Australian SMEs (OECD, 2004). However, the focus on commercialization activities
provided a range of significant challenges to CRCs, including broadening the expertise
required within the organization, with the accompanying risk of weakening the focus on
research excellence, training and other missions.
The relationships between the evolution of Program objectives, expanded Centre
activities and forms of organization structure are important to note here. Perhaps the clearest
example in this regard is in relation to intellectual property (IP) arrangements. In general,
CRCs are either incorporated tax exempt legal entities or unincorporated joint ventures.
While incorporated CRCs can act fully as a commercial agent and directly hold IP,
unincorporated joint ventures have a principal agent and administering authority (usually a
University) and often establish an external legal entity for commercial transactions including
IP. From 2002, the government preference was for CRCs to become incorporated (OECD,
2004), fitting with the vision of CRCs becoming economic actors more fully engaged with
marketization activities. Despite this, many CRCs preferred at this time to remain
unincorporated, with a key public sector member holding IP developed within the CRC.
Instead, legal entities were spun off from CRCs to deal with the challenges associated with
holding IP and negotiating commercial agreements. In effect, CRCs appeared somewhat
ambivalent on the question of functioning as economic actors fully engaged in marketization
activities, preferring rather to create a third-party structure to cope with extended
commercial imperatives. However, as older CRCs finished their funding period and newer
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CRCs came into existence the overall balance of the Program shifted toward incorporated
structures. By mid-2010, just eight of 42 CRCs (19%) were not incorporated (DIISR,
2010b), indicating the previous Program objectives had influenced CRC structures in the
medium term. It will be some time before the marketization capabilities of current CRCs can
be realistically assessed. With the most recent changes to Program objectives deemphasising commercialisation, it also remains somewhat unclear as to what extent
incorporated CRCs will pursue this activity directly.

(Table 2 about here)

A second important change in the structure of the CRCs has been driven by trends in
the sectoral contributions to R&D and innovation in Australia. Table 2 shows government
funding and participant contributions for each round of CRCs from 1990 to 2006. Over the
life of the program nearly A$12 billion has been invested in the centres through government
grants and partner-contributed funds or ‘in-kind’ contributions. The government grant to the
centres has leveraged about three times its cost in funding from other partners. Each CRC
requires a higher education partner and it is no surprise that universities are the major
contributors to CRCs, providing at least one-fifth of the resources in each funding round. In
the 2000 and 2002 rounds universities’ contribution exceeded 30 per cent of CRC resources,
leading some universities to find themselves overexposed to the CRC Program. O’Kane
noted that Go8 (large, established metropolitan) universities were becoming increasing
reluctant to participate in new CRCs (O’Kane, 2008). While the Go8 dominate, contributing
around half of the university resources to CRCs, the proportion of university resources from
the non-Go8 university grew slightly from 47.7 per cent in the first five rounds to 51.4 per
cent in the second five rounds. Three trends in the data in Table 2 mirror the broader
changes in the national innovation system. First is the general increase in industry funding to
the centres. As a proportion, industry and industry association contributions to the centres
grew from 16.4 per cent of the centres’ budgets in the first five rounds to 21.5 per cent in the
second five rounds. Second, the universities’ contribution also grew proportionally from
21.8 to 26.5 per cent of the centres budget. Lastly, and most markedly, is the decline in
CSIRO participation in the Centres, from 17 per cent of resources in the 1990 round to less
than 3 per cent in the 2006 round. Overall, CSIRO’s contribution declined as a proportion of
resources from 14.7 per cent in the first five rounds to 7.1 per cent in the latter five rounds.
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From being a three way collaboration of university, industry and government researchers the
CRCs are now dominated by bilateral partnerships of universities and industry.
The third point we wish to make here is the great diversity in the objectives and
aspirations of the CRCs themselves. The outputs from CRCs provide an indication of what it
is that they value. Output ‘value’ is clearly articulated in centre research and management
plans. In a collection of CRC output data (Garrett-Jones & Turpin, 2002) centres were asked
to nominate what they described as their most valued outputs. Academic publications
outputs are highly valued in terms of benefit to careers and academic research funding.
Interestingly, apart from the typical research breakthroughs and advances made in their key
fields, a wide range of activities were nominated. For example, the following outputs were
defined by some CRCs as among their most ‘valued’ achievements:
•

A forestry CRC described their Forestry ‘Tool Box’, information sheets
distributed at field days and agricultural shows as a significant output (rural
manufacturing sector).

•

In contributing to their community awareness objective the CRC for
conservation management initiated the ‘Great Australian Marsupial Nightstalk’ a community based spotlight surveys involving people of all ages from
all over Australia (environment sector).

•

The Centre for Mining technology and equipment noted that they specifically
targeted trade journals, magazines, newspapers as a key mechanism for
diffusing research outcomes (mining and energy sector).

•

The Aboriginal health CRC specifically targets Aboriginal health workers for
professional training rather than typical PhD or Masters programs (medical and
health sector).

These are clearly valuable outputs in terms of the CRC objectives and are directly
aligned with their Centres’ objectives and strategies. But in practice valued outputs from the
perspective of individual researchers and centre managers may vary. Further, how they align
with the organisational priorities and institutional structures that determine researchers’
careers or with the performance measures and the funding formulae imposed by the federal
government is another matter. But unless their value is aligned with other varying centre
outputs there will be the possibility for tension between the career expectations of
researchers and the development expectations of CRCs.
The above discussion leads us to several conclusions on the dynamics of the CRCs as
cross sectoral R&D centres.
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1. There is still an active debate about the role and scope of the CRC program,
including (1) how broadly should we define ‘industry and other end-users of
research’ in the context of the CRCs and other collaboratives; (2) what is an
appropriate balance between ‘commercial’ and ‘public good’ research within
various schemes; and (3) should programs such as CRCs legitimately support
research which primarily benefits only one company? In other words, how far
should CRCs span the spectrum of public, socially oriented research on the
one hand, and appropriable industrial research on the other?
2. Over time, and due to structural changes in Australia’s public research sector,
CRCs have become dominated by industry and academic researchers and have
moved away from government involvement both directly (government
researchers) and indirectly (CRC program grants).
3. We have argued that a push to ‘marketization’ risked the CRCs becoming too
conservative in their research agendas, and thus less attractive to academic
researchers. Whatever policies guide cross-sector R&D collaboration, they
need to allow for the demonstrated great variance in objectives and outputs.
Following a period of emphasised commercial orientation, the funding
guidelines and structures of individual CRCs have recently become more
heterogeneous, both in the funding period, the mode of organisation and scope
of disciplinary research permitted.
Our purpose here is not to pursue each of these debates in detail. Rather it is to show
that the nature of formalised cross-sector R&D collaboration has changed significantly in
several important dimensions related to objectives, performance measures and organization
even over the course of a single government program – the CRC program. We note that each
centre’s context is shaped by national policy and funding regime, factors specific to the
disciplinary and sectoral environment of the centre, and factors specific to the collaborating
institutional partners. The management of the centres operate within this context and these
constraints.

3.3 Research Methodology
The results reported in this paper come from a ‘research culture’ survey of respondents (n =
370) from public sector organizations involved in the management and conduct of
collaborative R&D in the Australian Cooperative Research centres, which was carried out in
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2004-05. The paper presents a qualitative analysis of the comments from 209 of these
respondents who chose to answer ‘open ended’ questions in the survey.
A written, mixed-mode (postal and web-based) survey (Diment & Garrett-Jones
2007) targeted a non-random but representative sample of about 1100 staff involved in the
management and conduct of CRC-based research in public sector organizations – i.e.
excluding industry partners which were the subject of a parallel study (Fulop & Couchman
2006). The survey achieved a 34 percent response rate. Respondents comprised researchers
and research managers from 37 CRCs, most of whom were involved directly as formal
participants. The majority (53 percent) of respondents identified themselves as from the
higher education sector, with 21 percent from the government research sector (see Table 1).
The respondent set was quite homogeneous: 82 percent of the respondents were men, 77
percent held a doctoral degree, and 11 percent held a masters degree. Two-thirds of the
respondents had participated in one CRC only, while the rest had been involved with
between two and seven CRCs.
The survey questionnaire presented 48 propositions about the respondent’s
experience with the CRC program. Analysis of these responses permitted a quantitative
ranking of the main benefits and problems in CRC participation, the management strategies
adopted, and the effect of CRC participation on research careers (Garrett-Jones and Turpin
2007) and comparison between the views of academic and government researchers (GarrettJones et al. 2005). The final question (optional) in each section allowed an open-ended
response to the themes of benefits, problems, administration issues and impact on career. Of
the respondents 209 (or 57 percent) chose to respond to one or more of the optional
questions. Their characteristics were almost identical to the full respondent group in terms of
their gender, highest qualification, length of time with the CRC and where they were
employed (Table 2) except that the miscellaneous ‘other’ group (which includes past
participants) is over-represented. The respondents did not seem unduly constrained by our
themes and furnished comments on a wide range of issues.
Every response was analyzed with the assistance of the QSR NVivo 2 software.
NVivo is a database management program designed for exploring complex unstructured
qualitative data. The program permits dynamic coding (establishment of categories and the
tagging of particular passages or words in the responses to one or more of these categories)
of selected passages from the responses and querying of the data by category, by respondent
and by other independent variables.
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Analysis was framed initially under the four themes of the survey: benefit, problems,
management strategies and career impacts (positive and negative). We then created
hierarchies of nodes in NVivo to capture and categories all of the respondent comments
from the survey that we deemed material, as in Chart 2. One of the benefits of the program
is that these nodes are dynamic and can overlap: a respondent’s comment, or part thereof,
can be referenced by multiple nodes. This allowed us to explore responses both from the
perspective of the individual respondent and their institutional affiliation, and the
perspective of institutional setting or functional domain to which they attributed particular
benefits or problems of centre membership. We then extracted views that seemed relate to
the issues identified from the literature: the cost/benefit determination made by respondents
– how they described the benefits of participation and decided that the benefits outweighed
the costs; different forms of trust and how they were assessed; and governance of the centres
and causes of and responses to dissatisfaction.
The choice of respondents’ comments reported here is subjective, but we have tried
to reflect the range of views and to balance disparate views where these exist. We note that
the respondents’ comments do not necessarily reflect the views of all respondents as
reflected by the survey as a whole. The more disaffected respondents may be ‘selfselecting’, for example. However, this does not detract from the value of the results in
highlighting potential problems for the management of the centres.

(Table 3 about here)

(Table 4 about here)

4 Findings
4.1

Drivers of centre participation

The motivating factors underlying individuals’ choices to join CRCs concerned mainly
intangible benefits. These included widening the range of scholars available for
collaboration, better access to industry partners and working with a larger cohort of scholars
with similar scientific interests. These expectations were expressed in similar terms by
almost all participants, irrespective of their sectoral background. In short, the expectation of
intensive research cohesion around a group of researchers from government, universities and
industry was the main attractor for most participants in the survey. Respondents reported
significant benefits in membership of their CRC. Indeed, two government researchers were
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effusive: ‘my association with the CRC has been extremely beneficial and rewarding and I
can think of few downsides to my participation in the CRC’; and ‘it is one of the best things
that has happened for me’.
The CRCs provided material resources; both financial and human. Senior academic
respondents nominated ‘money for continuing research activities’, with ‘greater stability and
longer-term funding’ than available elsewhere. Government researchers mentioned funds for
staff and ‘generous PhD scholarships’ and for research communication activities such as
‘opportunities for conference attendance/workshop participation not otherwise supported by
my organization’.
Most benefits identified were intangible and came from the interaction with partners
in the CRC. Comments praised the value of peer relations with researchers in their own
field: ‘membership in a group of otherwise disparate scholars’; ‘a spirit of belonging to a
broad research community’; or simply ‘access to ideas’. These contacts were either
unavailable through their home organization, or more difficult to arrange: ‘If I weren’t
associated with the CRC I would be working mostly in isolation’ said a postdoctoral
researcher. Some researchers reported a significant cost in not being part of a CRC, because
it provided an element that was otherwise missing from the respondent’s ‘scientific domain’.
The CRC not only embedded the researchers in their peer groups, it also helped them
to broaden their research perspectives through positive interaction with scientists working in
other disciplines. For one academic environmental scientist, it ‘opened up my eyes to a
different approach to research’.
Other benefits nominated by both academic and government respondents were
directly related to their own careers and capabilities. This ranged from employment to
assisting with career progression: ‘greatly increased scope and confidence…in applying for
senior jobs’; or other personal goals: ‘promised opportunities to remain in a rural town’;
‘spin-off company giving broad experience and consulting work post-retirement from the
university and CRC’. Involvement with the CRC led to new personal skills, notably in
management and leadership It ‘allowed me to fulfil or expand [my] scientific management
aspiration’ explained a government agricultural scientist); gave one respondent a ‘better
understanding of IP management and commercialization’; and for an academic, ‘got me to
work more efficiently (to meet deadlines)’.
Comments also related to consolidating or changing participants’ research direction.
Several respondents commented on the value of closer relations with industry, and provision
of a business or commercial focus for their research. One late-career researcher gained a
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‘wider view of my research area, especially with respect to application of results in
industry’. The CRC allowed one ex-government researcher to ‘continue to undertake
research in the same field as that for my PhD’. For a senior government researcher,
‘networking and identification of other commercial/clinical areas have re-focused my
research career’.
Benefits for research groups within the partner organizations were also identified.
CRC involvement provided a ‘means of uniting the interests of [university] departmental
members who would otherwise have quite disparate interests’. For one government
researcher, the ‘program [gave] a strong strategic focus for a major research group in [my
organization]’. Others found that improved status and recognition had resulted: ‘a useful
lever to get better support within my organization’; and ‘the CRC has increased my visibility
among peers and industry partners’.
The benefits identified by respondents were varied, but they overwhelmingly related
to the domain of ‘science’ and the quality of the research they personally, and within their
immediate research groups, were able to do. They valued the improvement in their
interaction with the scientific community, the perspectives that researchers in other
disciplines and institutions brought to their research, and the view of ‘different ways of
doing things’ that interaction with commercial firms gave to their research. They were
closely aware of the personal benefits to them as career researchers, for continuing the kind
of work they found productive, extension of their skills and career prospects, and their
standing within their institution and the scientific community. While they valued the
cohesion that the focus of the CRC work gave to their research group or department, they
rarely expressed benefit in terms of advantage to their organization per se. Their perspective
of benefit was almost solely on what we might term the ‘scientific’ and ‘academic’ domains.
This ‘science-based’ view of the benefits also influenced our respondents’ views of the
costs of participation. Broadly, anything that distanced them from the network of high
quality researchers, or diverted them from their own research, was seen as a cost. These
costs emerged when we looked at the role of trust and competition in developing a cohesive
group identity for the centre.

4.2

Negotiating centre identities

Like many new organizational structures newly established CRCs undergo a period of
organizational identity building. Drawing the constituent elements into a coherent
organizational culture is, in a sense, a community activity. Building trust, negotiating
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priorities, and steering a common course through potential rewards and risks are all part of
this process. The impression of the centres received from the respondents’ comments is one
of a rather fragile coalition of interests. The ‘glue’ that holds this collaboration together is
firstly mutual trust between the participants, and, second, a range of formally agreed
activities and rules.

4.2.1

Perceptions of trust

Both trust in competence and trust in intention (Nooteboom 2000) were important in the
minds of our respondents when describing relations with their partners in the CRCs.
Competence expressed itself particularly in respondents’ assessment of the quality of the
researchers in the collaboration:
Inconsistent calibre of researchers—the CEO was not in a position to tell research
agencies that their researchers were inappropriate (because of their skills or
performance) the CRC had to adopt a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach. It was
slowed down by its weakest members (CRC survey respondent, 2005).
In the view of another respondent, ‘company members supply their second-level staff’.
Initial selection of partners was seen as crucial, and yet a government respondent made the
criticism that the quality of the researchers appeared to be a secondary consideration:
The university with the most knowledge may not necessarily be working on the project.
Who is doing the work is more likely to be the uni that initiates the proposal (CRC
survey respondent, 2005).
Respondents also identified partners as unable (rather than unwilling) to manage themselves
to deliver appropriate inputs, rather than lacking in scientific competence: ‘lack of vision by
industry partners’ said a senior manager of the CRC, and ‘very little feedback on the
adoption of research outcomes by industry/partner agencies/stakeholders’ commented a
senior government researcher. Criticising a specific government agency, one respondent
claimed:
…[named agency] is the bureaucracy-laden, meetings/talkfest focused organization, not
the CRC; CRC staff are too busy doing what industry actually wants and thereby get
another term to waste the amount of resources [named agency] staff do (CRC survey
respondent, 2005).
Generally, however, failings by other partners resulting in ‘competition at the expense of
collaboration’ were interpreted in terms of the party’s self-interest and lack of commitment,
rather than their incapacity. Both individuals and organizations were nominated as
opportunist and unwilling to collaborate openly and fairly: ‘certain individuals from other
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academic institutions [forgot] that the first ‘C’ stands for cooperative’; and ‘some
institutions are NOT ‘cooperative’ said several academic respondents.
In summary, respondents lost faith in their partners when they were: (1) viewed as
poor quality researchers, (2) viewed as incapable of delivering knowledge, results or
feedback, or (3) seemed to lack commitment to the ethos of cooperation or were perceived to
be pursuing their own ends.
Two factors commonly mentioned that led to this lack of trust were: (1) inadequate
commitment of resources (usually people and money)—either actual or perceived (or
unverifiable), and (2) domination of or undue influence on the direction of the collaboration
or of the potential rewards. Academics and government respondents suggested that he way
that CRCs were structured made it difficult for partners to assess whether each other was
‘pulling their weight’. ‘Costing models between partners are wildly different and project
budgeting is a major source of mistrust’, said one. Reneging on commitments was viewed
seriously: ‘ensuring in-kind contributions match commitments’; ‘multi-partner programs are
unwieldy when [the] percentage commitment of individual staff is low (<30%) and overridden by host institution priorities’ were raised as problems. ‘Inflexible and one-sided IP
arrangements’ were also viewed with distrust as a form of self-interest.
The factors contributing to the maintenance of trust between partners appeared
similar to other IORs, but judgments of trustworthiness were made more difficult by the
inherently unmeasurable nature of R&D outcomes and difficulty of assessing the actual
level of resources (particularly ‘in-kind’ staff time) actually being committed by the
partners. The actions that seemed to be regarded as most trustworthy were: being able to
carry out quality research, exchanging information and knowledge, executing agreed tasks
and generally being accommodating to and cooperative with other partners.
The challenge to both individual and institutional participants in the centres was to
‘make stronger efforts together to achieve the main aim’ and acknowledge ‘each other’s
needs and goals’, in the view of one CRC employee; or simply, ‘to learn how to cooperate
rather than compete’ by a university-based respondent. In the following section, we consider
what implications these views have for the governance of CRCs.

4.2.2

Perceptions of governance

The role of governance is to unite the CRC around agreed strategies and to reconcile various
goals. There is also formal obligation to report to the partners and the funding agency on
research projects and outcomes. Surprisingly, respondents were quite ambiguous about the
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governance of the centres and regarded these activities as unnecessary costs. Many found
administration frustrating, cumbersome and burdensome. ‘Transaction costs are very high’
and ‘there is a large administrative cost linking different institutions’; ‘dual reporting needs’,
were typical responses when asked about problems with the management of the CRC.
Transaction costs were viewed as more onerous than with alternative forms of research
support: ‘compared to an [Australian Research Council] grant, a CRC has a much greater
administrative cost and suffers from the possibility that the funds can be altered through the
life of a project’ commented a senior academic. Respondents found the CRCs cumbersome
and unresponsive in more commercially-oriented activities too: ‘slow processes with regards
to commercialization, licensing and marketing’ charged one information technology
academic.
Respondents commonly criticised the centres’ (and the program’s) governance
activities because of their detrimental effect on research. The management burden distracted
them from their main concern of carrying out research: a ‘massive percentage of funds spent
on administration rather than research’; and, ‘the CRC reporting requirements strongly
impinge upon research time and activities’ were typical claims. Another academic was
annoyed about ‘arbitrary decisions to reduce committed funding to enable ‘communication’.
A further point of contention was the ‘politicking’ and power relations within the
centres. As one senior academic succinctly put it: ‘if you can capture the centre, you are
provided for; if not you are marginalised’. ‘Autocratic leadership; high staff turnover; lack
of communications; lack of transparency on employment of researchers’ were some of the
specific problems listed. ‘This is a not a collaborative organization…internal politics rather
than rational assessment of priorities determines resource allocation’; and administration
seemed ‘pointless’, with ‘no management feedback even to project leaders’ claimed two
academic respondents.
Some respondents felt ignored, ‘I do not have much say in the affairs of CRC. I
know I have the capacity to contribute more but no takers’. Others felt controlled, ‘we get
told what to do’, or even coerced: ‘many of us were put in the [nominated] CRC by senior
[university] management without any discussion in order to meet…targets shown in the
proposal. Most of us were not even aware of the proposal, nor asked if we wished to be
involved… Attempts to be removed from the [nominated] CRC were met with threats of
dismissal’.
Two main findings emerge. The first is the ‘coordination burden’ or increased
transaction costs of complex cross-sectoral, multi-organizational collaboration. Respondents
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expected their ‘CRC experience’ to be about research, not about administration. This was
particularly felt when feedback and communication were lacking. The second is the
expectation of collegiality and cooperation in the governance of the centres. The respondents
demanded a strong say in the strategy and running of the CRC and were unhappy when they
were not consulted and engaged.
Negotiating a CRC ‘identity’ is revealed as very much a collective process. But it is
not simply generating a coalition of interests from participating partner organizations. It is a
social process of defining boundaries: who we are; what we do; what is acceptable and what
is not; who is in and who is out. It is these very individual definitions as much as any
organizational expectation that drives centre identity building.

4.3

Resolving competition

To the extent that individual expectations are part of the ‘centre building’ process there are
likely to be conflicts of interests or divided loyalties, particularly among those on part-time
secondment to CRCs. As noted, researchers generally commit only part-time to the CRC and
remain based in their ‘home’ organization—their university or government laboratory. This
led to respondents’ experiencing the symptoms of ‘role strain’, identifying overload and
‘divided loyalties as an issue, particularly with long running CRCs’. Having two masters
made it harder to work within the CRC framework than on projects which were less
complex in structure, as one government researcher observed:
It is a constant challenge to meet the multi-layered management requirements of both
[the home organization] and the CRC. There is potential for both conflict and
administrative overload, which makes CRC participation significantly harder work
(albeit rewarding) than simply working 100% on [the home organization] projects (CRC
survey respondent, 2005).
Another government-based respondent interpreted this as losing control of the project:
…organizational commitment to allowing time (that is, having time left over from other
organizational duties to dedicate to CRC projects) which means much of the running of
the projects is necessarily left to university researchers (CRC survey respondent, 2005).
‘Interaction with parent institution’ and ‘an inherent problem of split loyalty between the
employer and the CRC’ were identified as problems by a large number of respondents: ‘[it
is] difficult to know who is the master, the CRC or [the partner]’. A senior manager
employed in a CRC, saw it more starkly: ‘their host organization always dominates the
researcher priority as that is who promotes and pays them’.
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Several sources of conflict were identified. The first was competition for resources—
primarily researchers’ time between the work of the CRC and the work of the parent
organization. Researchers felt pulled between their ‘regular job’ and their commitment to the
CRC: ‘meeting deadlines due to ‘normal’ core commitments’; and ‘too much of my time
spent in managing researchers and contracts for the CRC’. But rather than seeing the issue
simply as one of individual choice, they criticised their organization. One academic
complained that ‘my university/school has not honoured my in-kind contribution to the
CRC’. A government researcher similarly observed ‘I was a program leader in the CRC. I
don’t think I was properly supported in the role by my own organization’. Researchers had
chosen to work with the CRC and expected their employer organization to support them and
to manage any conflicts. When the organization did not, this competition for resources could
affect researchers who were not affiliated with the CRC, and give rise to competition within
the partner organization, as in the case of this university:
The CRC research and time commitments done by faculty in our school who have
contract agreements is being subsidised by another faculty. This is because no [money]
was given to the school to cover the teaching and administrative responsibilities of these
faculty members. It has led to a major rift within our school and has severely impacted
the ability of non-CRC committed faculty to engage in research (CRC survey
respondent, 2005).
The second conflict was between the ways that CRC acted and the practices and norms of
the partner organizations. A senior manager in government characterised this as a ‘clash in
management ethos between [the CRC’s] CEO and the practice of the participating
organization’, while a CRC manager commented on the participants ‘interfering with
management structures of other parties’. This was found in communication, timing of
activities, accepted protocols for supervision of research students and so on: the ‘CRC
attempts to control [postgraduate] students with no regard to supervisors’, claimed a senior
academic; while a senior government researcher countered:
[The] main work force in CRC [is] derived from PhD students. This leads to a conflict
between research and commercial priorities. Students need to do work to complete their
PhDs whereas industry is focused on producing products (CRC survey respondent,
2005).
Another academic respondent welcomed ‘funding for students’ as a benefit, but noted that
‘regrettably [the funding] does not go through university channels’ and thus did not earn
matching funds from university block grants for research.
A particular conflict was identified between the work of the CRC and the reward
structures of the partner organization. This could have a direct and immediate effect on the
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career of the researcher if the researcher’s service was not recognized by the partner
organization:
When my contract with [nominated agency] expired…I had worked for the organization
[for more than seven years]. However, I was advised I was ineligible for ‘indefinite’
appointment because I had been a CRC associate employee for most of this time! So no,
I got no benefit from being a CRC employee with [nominated agency] (CRC survey
respondent, 2005).
In many cases, as an early-career researcher employed by a CRC observed,
‘researchers in CRC do not have [a] clear career path’. Often, the impact was more subtle.
‘The research success of an employee in a CRC project may not necessarily be properly
acknowledged by the employer’ said a semi-retired respondent. Another, seconded to a CRC
at a senior level, found a ‘complete disjoint between performance appraisal by my employer
and my actual work in CRC’.
Conversely, the requirements of the CRC might prevent or stifle peer recognition of
the researcher, either by their employer, or in their wider scientific peer group. Two areas
specifically identified were: (1) constraints on free publication and (2) access to prestigious
research grants from bodies such as the Australian Research Council (ARC). Several
academic respondents nominated ‘publication restrictions’ and ‘delays in publishing while
CRC makes decisions about IP protection’. Another academic who had experienced
publication delays lamented, ‘the short-term objectives of the CRC are destructive for an
academic career’. Ineligibility for ARC funding in particular was hard felt by academics. It
potentially hampered recruitment to the CRC and collaboration with researchers outside the
CRC, as a senior government researcher noted:
Academics on ARC funding [are] very unwilling to collaborate lest ARC and CRC
support is seen to mix—a number of very exciting and important collaboration
opportunities [were] lost as ARC funded researchers were unwilling to ‘risk’ their ARC
support by taking benefit from CRC projects (CRC survey respondent, 2005).
Because CRCs bring together research and commercial interests, it is not surprising that
a further field of conflict within the CRC can be a philosophical clash between the rationale
of CRC and its industry partners and the norms of ‘science’. This may not adversely affect
immediate rewards, but some researchers clearly felt uncomfortable about the direction of
the CRC and the balance of its activities. Comments by academics on particular CRCs
included: ‘too much emphasis on commercial outcomes and not enough emphasis on
research’; ‘lack of scientific vision —short-term objectives prioritised’; ‘suppression of truly
innovative basic research’. Conversely, a senior government researcher charged that ‘some
academic researchers [are] biased against ‘applied’ CRC research’. Criticism was also made
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of the program as whole: ‘if the Science is left out in favour of commercialization issues I
believe the image and product of the CRCs will suffer considerably’ said an environmental
scientist working for government agency.
Some participants reacted personally to these problems. One ex-industry researchers
suggested that ‘evasion’ takes place:
The CRCs message as conveyed by the CEO, the Executive Research Committee and
the relevant program coordinator has been effectively ignored by project leaders, who
have been protected by their institution’s management (CRC survey respondent, 2005)
‘Exit’ is an option too. Several respondents reported that they were quitting An earlycareer academic commented, ‘my attempts to maintain an external collaboration tore me
apart (double management reporting presentation etc) so much that I am leaving this job
with the CRC to take a regular funded position overseas’. Others had ‘decided not to
participate in other CRCs’, or, more forcefully, ‘it has clarified my directions—I never want
to work with one again’. At the organizational level, selective exit was considered: ‘Some
projects were withdrawn from the CRC so that a higher level of external investment and low
level of encumbrance could be achieved’ revealed a senior government manager.
In highlighting these different aspects of competition we argue that they reveal
different ‘functional domains’ that co-exist within the centre and across the partner
organizations. Individual participants’ expectations are formative in defining these domains
– for example, adherence to the norms of science, or expectation of advancement in an
academic career – but their management and interrelationships are matters for the
organizational partners. Without effective institutional management, individual participants
have little redress but withdrawal.
The survey comments reveal that participants have a clear expectation of the benefits
that their centre membership will provide, clear benchmarks on how to assess their
collaborative partners behaviour, and strong ideas on how the centre is run cooperatively
with the least administrative burden. When it came to identifying the problems with
collaboration there is multiple evidence of competing performance demands, ‘divided
loyalties’, lack of awareness of performance measures in partner organizations, lack of a
career path, hampering of access to publication or funding opportunities, and lack of a
fundamental or longer term view of research. This provides evidence of both individual and
institutional ‘role strain’. It also suggests that the risks of collaboration are borne both by the
individual researchers and by the institutional partners. The individual feels this risk to their
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career trajectory – whether being tied to unproductive research, or out of a job - while the
institution considers opportunity costs and detriment to other staff or activities.

5

Conclusions:

5.1

Negotiating open science, trust and careers

The chapter distils the views of more than 200 participants in a particular form of crosssector research centre in Australia. We conclude that the working environment and
sustainability of such centres cannot be understood by looking solely at the individual
choices of researchers, nor solely at the strategies of the partner organizations. Both are
formative, and both, in turn, are influenced by the broader institutional and policy contexts
in which they operate. In highlighting important management issues which have been
recognized generally within IORs and illuminating these with the views of the CRC
participants we aim to improve the management of the dynamic organizations that are
collaborative R&D centres. The IOR perspective is useful is emphasising the role of trust in
loosely collaborative relationships, the ambiguity of formal governance, and the coexistence of organizational ‘functional domains’ which have the potential to compete or
conflict. These are issues that have not been ignored in relation to cross-sector R&D, but
have perhaps been under-researched.
Our respondents tended to see the benefits of the CRC first in terms of advantage to
their own research career and second in terms of the ‘scientific’ domain in which their career
resided. Their most immediate concern seemed to be that of their own career—how they
were able to perform their research, their conditions and rewards—their prospects for
advancement. They regarded as a cost or a burden anything (administration, reporting, shorttermism, constraints on publication) that diverted them from their research career. At the
same time, the presence of commercial partners and the government’s goals for the CRC
program, which imposed a commercial imperative on the collaboration, was not unwelcome
in itself. In this sense our findings are unremarkable: the respondents’ expectations are not
that different from those found in other research groups ‘at the interface of, university
research’ (Harvey, Pettigrew and Ferlie 2002). What our findings do show is that CRC
researchers frame their identity primarily in terms of a culture of open science, built on the
quality and validity of research performed, which is ensured through public sharing of
knowledge (Liebeskind and Oliver 1998; Ziman 1991).
The second conclusion we draw is in relation to the importance of informal ‘trust’ by
comparison with formal governance of the centres. Respondents were quite clear in the
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importance they attached to their research partners’ competence and commitment. However
they were far more ambiguous about the governance and coordination activities of the
centres. There are two ways of looking at how cooperation can be ensured: (1) a social
theory approach—reciprocity, mutual forbearance, relational trust (based on experience);
and (2) using transaction cost economics—with the concept of opportunism (not acting
cooperatively), and monitoring of performance, sanctions (legal punishment, penalties and
so on) (Menard 2004; Handy 1995; Nooteboom 2000). While the level of administration and
reporting in the CRCs might imply the latter approach, in reality, any form of imposed
sanction was viewed by respondents most unfavourably. Thus, although the collaboration
between the partner organizations is contractual (because they are legal entities), its
implementation and enforcement at the level of the department and individual researcher
appears to be informal. This raises the question of effective coordination in a multiinstitutional environment, where the partners and individual researchers essentially remain
free agents, despite contractual commitments.
Respondents were clearly expecting reciprocity in the degree of commitment and
expertise, provision of resources and information, forbearance of different ways of working
and an absence of opportunism. Any evidence of a breach caused respondents to become
less enthusiastic about the centre, and sometimes to quit the CRC. Monitoring of
performance might have helped to identify breaches, but there were few sanctions that could
be applied on one partner by another. The only sanction therefore was to withdraw, or
threaten to withdraw, from current or future collaboration, thus breaking the durability of the
relationship.
The findings support the need to consider closely the ‘costs of coordination and
relationship development in these collaborations’ (Cummings and Kiesler 2005:704). But in
contrast to Cummings and Kiesler’s claim that greater trust and respect is associated with
more frequent communication, respondents in our survey did not universally applaud effort
on formal ‘communication activities’. Further research is clearly warranted on how formal
activities within the centres can buttress rather than undermine construction of trust between
the partners in different settings.
Lastly, our findings suggest the existence of a range of tensions and competing
demands within cross-sector R&D arrangements which go beyond the notion of individual
‘role strain’. Certainly individual scientists may become torn between the objectives of their
own academic ‘identity’, the norms and requirements of their university department and
scientific discipline and the mission of the CRC. Our survey shows that many of the
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participants will not accept a high ‘power distance’ and expect to be allowed to behave in an
‘individualistic’ manner (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005) in relation to their scientific
creativity. These tensions imply an institutional as well as an individual response. For
example, if we consider the management problem of ‘threat of exit’ we need to recognize
that this ‘threat point’ can occur at different levels. It is possible for a researcher (academic
level) to decide to or threaten to withdraw from CRC participation, even though continued
participation may be to the benefit of their discipline (scientific) or laboratory/university
(organizational).
Managing an organization like a CRC requires recognition of the needs of these
different functional domains and relationships, as well as an understanding of the
competition that they provoke. This includes the potential for conflict internally over
governance and strategy and between the CRCs and the norms and practices of the
contributing partners. Intangible benefits and their implications for individuals’ careers are
important factors that motivate researchers to participate in CRCs. Organizational partners
are usually seeking more tangible outcomes although they too are also motivated by the
potential for enhanced scientific prestige. As centres endure some of these expectations are
met and some are not. Individuals and organizational partners will continue to negotiate the
costs and benefits of meeting their expectations. As the process unfolds for individuals and
organizational partners some will come and some will go. Consequently it is likely that
while there are conflicts of interest to be resolved the centre identities will continue to be
renegotiated.
We have shown that the experience of researchers in CRCs is coloured by influences
operating at several different levels. First is the broad national policy environment. CRCs
are funded under a federal government program, in place for over two decades. Over this
period, government funding has remained relatively static in dollar terms. These funds have
leveraged increasing contributions from other participants, notably industry and universities.
The funding guidelines for the program, and government rhetoric, have reflected changing
currents in the policy debate over the function of such cross-sectoral R&D centres, and have
led to several significant changes in direction and focus for the centres. Unrelated to the
CRC program, but affecting it have been other shifts in the national system, such as the
declining role of government laboratories and the growth of the university sector. As a
consequence the role of government as a research partners in the CRCs has declined
substantially.
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Second is the immediate institutional, scientific and sectoral context of the particular
CRC. Universities will adopt different approaches to managing their involvement in CRCs.
The drivers and performance measures of CRCs in the medical prosthetics or growth factors
sectors are quite different from those of centres in Aboriginal health or greenhouse gas
accounting.
Lastly is the immediate organizational management of the CRC itself and the
relationship between its researchers and with its partners. The Australian CRCs embody
many features of ‘Mode 2’ collaborative science, with its flexibility and ability to respond to
contextual changes in science itself and in the application of science. Indeed it may be
counterproductive for individual CRCs to become entrenched. However, if the important
role of cross-sectoral collaborative R&D centres is to be retained without damage to the
science and innovation system as a whole, the ‘academic’ and ‘scientific’ domains that we
describe must be nurtured, not eroded. This may require new styles of management, by the
CRCs themselves and their participant organizations, which recognize the knowledge
resources—the scientific disciplines and careers of individual researchers on which they are
founded.

5.2

Broader policy implications

It has been claimed that one of the outcomes of CRC funding has been their formative role
in acting as agents of change in the university research system. The question is important
because as government sponsored collaborative research programs have expanded so too has
their potential to transform career patterns of researchers, the disciplinary boundaries in
universities and the organizational structures and regulations that govern them. The current
review suggests two further lines of investigation. The first is the effect of scales and forms
of organization on cross-sector R&D outcomes while the second is in relation to the
dynamics and sustainability of cooperative centres.
Scale and forms of organization constrain the management issues. For example, in
European studies (Jacob 2000:25) the question of ‘is Mode 2 research worth it from the
individual researcher’s point of view?’ is couched in terms of disadvantaged ‘contract’
researchers (in the centres) on the one hand, in contrast to well-resourced ‘tenured’
academics (in traditional university departments) on the other. In the Australian CRCs the
situation is more akin to the US model described by Boardman and Bozeman (2007) where
researchers face competing demands. The majority of academic researchers retain their
existing university position, and agree to commit a proportion of their time to the
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collaboration. Similarly, government researchers are not seconded to the CRC but remain
employed by their partner organization. Relatively few researchers (with the exception
notably of postdoctoral fellows) are employed directly by the CRC itself. In this regard,
CRCs are perhaps atypical of cross-sector R&D centres which directly employ staff or
second them full time on contract.
It also raises the question of how durable the cross-sector R&D organizations are and
how their management can change over time. On one hand, this form of organization is
becoming more dominant. On the other, the collaborations need to remain flexible and
responsive with ‘ceaseless reconfiguration of resources, knowledge and skills’ (Gibbons et
al. 1994:47). CRCs are not ‘cooperatives’ in the sense of being member-based,
democratically controlled organizations. But they may start this way, recruiting voluntary
participants in the bid for grant funding. In terms of Handy’s four organizational ‘cultures’
(power/role/task/person) they start as a ‘person culture’ and move into a ‘task culture’ once
goals are agreed and funding achieved. This sequences implies a balance between
cooperation and cohesion (which, to some extent, implies control), a view endorsed by
Chompalov et al. (2002:752) who ‘suggest that collaborations be viewed in terms of the
principle that ‘consensus precedes hierarchy’’. CRCs start as cooperative bids, but must
develop more cohesion and coordination to be effective. The problems, as Nooteboom
(2000) observes, is that if networks are too cohesive they may become exclusionary, and if
too durable they create inertia. They may be very effective for particular well defined tasks,
but in the process they lose flexibility and ability to change. At the extremes, two scenarios
may play out in the life cycle of a CRC. First, is ‘disintegration’, where the ground rules are
either too weak or not accepted or adhered to by all partners and individual participants. The
second is ‘integration’, where the rules are so effective that they stifle change—perhaps for
good reason, such as a focus on commercial production. We conjecture that CRCs that form
as a stimulating cooperative research environment may change into a setting that some
researchers find unproductive or frustrating to their science or their careers. They usually
have the option of retreating to their ‘parent’ organization and leave the collaboration if the
strain becomes too great. We were unable to make a longitudinal study of particular CRCs,
although we were able to contrast the views of researchers who had been associated with the
CRC program for shorter or longer periods. This speculative proposition therefore needs
testing through further longitudinal studies of cross-sector R&D organizations.
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Table 1 Evolving CRC Program objectives over the 12 funding rounds from 1990 – 2010
2000-02

2004-06

2009-10

To enhance the
contribution of longterm scientific and
technological
research and
innovation to
Australia’s
sustainable
economic and social
development;

To enhance
Australia’s
industrial,
commercial and
economic growth
through the
development of
sustained, userdriven cooperative
public-private
research centres that
achieve high levels
of outcomes in
adoption and
commercialisation.

To deliver significant
economic,
environmental and
social benefits to
Australia by supporting
end-user driven
research partnerships
between publicly
funded researchers and
end-users to address
clearly articulated,
major challenges that
require medium to
long-term collaborative
efforts.

1990-92

To support long-term highquality scientific and
technological research
which contributes to
national objectives,
including economic and
social development, the
maintenance of a strong
capability in basic research
and the development of
internationally competitive
industry sectors;
To capture the benefits of
research, and to strengthen
the links between research
and its commercial and
other applications, by the
active involvement of the
users of research in the
work of the Centres;
To build Centres of
research concentration by
promoting cooperative
research, and through it a
more efficient use of
resources in the national
research effort;

To enhance the
transfer of research
output into
commercial or other
outcomes of
economic,
environmental or
social benefit to
Australia;
To enhance the
value to Australia of
graduate
researchers; and
To enhance
collaboration among
researchers, between
researchers and
industry or other
users, and to
improve efficiency
in the use of
intellectual and
other research
resources.

To stimulate education and
training, particularly in
graduate programs, through
the active involvement of
researchers from outside the
higher education system in
educational activities, and
graduate students in major
research programs.
Source: O’Kane, 2008; DIISR, 2010a.
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Table 2 CRC Program funding and contributions by selection round, 1990 to 2006

Contributions
Selection Round

A$ million (current prices)
1990
1991
1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Sub-total
1990 1996

Sub-total
1998 2006

Total

CRC Program Funding

253.8

199.2

175.8

141.6

231.9

410.2

323.2

473.0

414.0

317.8

1,002.3

1,938.2

2,940.5

Universities

174.4

166.0

135.5

111.2

183.4

478.8

488.8

704.6

273.6

231.5

770.5

2,177.3

2,947.8

Sub-total Go8
Universities

140.9

85.3

61.9

37.8

77.2

278.4

302.7

278.2

124.3

73.8

403.1

1,057.4

1,460.5

CSIRO

143.5

96.2

115.8

66.0

98.1

196.2

141.5

101.3

109.2

32.2

519.6

580.4

1,100.0

Industry

113.6

61.9

69.5

72.5

176.0

303.9

195.5

456.8

230.6

253.6

493.5

1,440.4

1,933.9

Industry associations

18.5

15.8

3.9

24.6

22.2

45.0

72.4

62.6

69.3

71.8

85.0

321.1

406.1

Federal Government
(excl. CRC Program
Funding)

44.2

32.7

20.8

8.3

31.0

99.4

34.3

119.7

32.8

18.8

137.0

305.0

442.0

State Government

32.8

71.2

81.7

83.8

58.9

216.9

258.8

223.4

191.2

121.8

328.4

1,012.1

1,340.5

Other

63.9

16.7

3.4

15.8

95.3

75.5

32.6

206.2

9.8

104.0

195.1

428.1

623.2

Total contributions
(excl. CRC Program
Funding)

590.9

460.5

430.6

382.2

664.9

1,415.7

1,223.9

1,874.6

916.5

833.7

2,529.1

6,264.4

8,793.5

Total

844.7

659.7

606.4

523.8

896.8

1,825.9

1,547.1

2,347.6

1,330.5

1,151.5

3,531.4

8,202.6

11,734.0
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Selection Round

Per cent of total
1990
1991

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Sub-total
1990 1996

Sub-total
1998 2006

Total

CRC Program Funding

30.0

30.2

29.0

27.0

25.9

22.5

20.9

20.1

31.1

27.6

28.4

23.6

25.1

Universities

20.6

25.2

22.3

21.2

20.5

26.2

31.6

30.0

20.6

20.1

21.8

26.5

25.1

Sub-total Go8
Universities

16.7

12.9

10.2

7.2

8.6

15.2

19.6

11.9

9.3

6.4

11.4

12.9

12.4

CSIRO

17.0

14.6

19.1

12.6

10.9

10.7

9.1

4.3

8.2

2.8

14.7

7.1

9.4

Industry

13.4

9.4

11.5

13.8

19.6

16.6

12.6

19.5

17.3

22.0

14.0

17.6

16.5

Industry associations

2.2

2.4

0.6

4.7

2.5

2.5

4.7

2.7

5.2

6.2

2.4

3.9

3.5

Federal Government
(excl. CRC Program
Funding)

5.2

5.0

3.4

1.6

3.5

5.4

2.2

5.1

2.5

1.6

3.9

3.7

3.8

State Government

3.9

10.8

13.5

16.0

6.6

11.9

16.7

9.5

14.4

10.6

9.3

12.3

11.4

Other

7.6

2.5

0.6

3.0

10.6

4.1

2.1

8.8

0.7

9.0

5.5

5.2

5.3

70.0

69.8

71.0

73.0

74.1

77.5

79.1

79.9

68.9

72.4

71.6

76.4

74.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

2.3
Leveraging (CRC
Program funds:
Contributions)
Source: O’Kane (2008), Appendix 4

2.3

2.4

2.7

2.9

3.5

3.8

4.0

2.2

2.6

2.5

3.2

3.0

Total contributions
(excl. CRC Program
Funding)
Total
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Table 3 Demography of survey respondents
Sector of
employment
Number of respondents
Proportion of respondents
Number of respondents
answering open-ended
questions
Proportion of respondents in
category answering openended questions

CRC
34

Higher
Education
196

Government
Research (a)
78

Government
Other (b)
43

Other (c)
19

Total
370

9.2%

53.0%

21.1%

11.6%

5.2%

100.0%

18

108

45

23

12

209

52.9%

55.1%

57.7%

53.5%

63.2%

56.5%

(a) A government organization whose primary purpose is research
(b) A government organization whose primary purpose is other than research
(c) ‘Other’ includes currently unemployed respondents, private consultants, staff employed by business
subsidiaries of the public organizations etc.
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Table 4 Example of hierarchical ‘nodes’ used in NVivo coding of responses
1.

Problems
1.1. Between partners
1.1.1.

Trust

1.1.1.1.

Competence

1.1.1.2.

Intention/opportunism

1.1.1.2.1.

Attitude

1.1.1.2.2.

Funding/resources

1.1.1.2.3.

Control/domination

1.2. Within home organization
1.2.1.

Resources/time

1.2.1.1. Lack of support
1.2.1.2. Competition for resources
1.2.2.

Rewards

1.2.2.1. Lack of recognition
1.3. In management of CRC
1.3.1.

Transaction costs, bureaucracy

1.3.1.1. Burden of reporting, dual reporting
1.3.2.

Conflict with norms of science

1.3.2.1. Publication restrictions
1.3.2.2. IP ownership
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